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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The financial status of provincial governments in Pakistan hinges largely on 
federal transfers to the provinces constituted through National Finance Commission 
(NFC) Awards.  These awards design the formula of distribution of resources between 
federal and provincial governments, and among the provinces for five years.  
Historically, federal and all provincial governments have tried their level best to get a 
higher share of the revenues in order to stabilise their own financial status.  As a result, 
there are very few examples of consensus based conclusive awards in the past. These 
consensus based awards have had different gainers.  For instance, in the NFC Award 
1991, provincial governments were the main beneficiaries as they received substantially 
higher shares of buoyant taxes such as sales and income taxes.  In contrast, the largest 
beneficiary of the NFC Award 1997 was the federal government as it allocated higher 
shares of all taxes to itself in order to stabilise its financial status.  Given the sensitivity 
attached to NFC awards, where an increase or decrease in the share of any tier of the 
government affects the share of other tiers with the same magnitude in the opposite 
direction, it seems very difficult to develop a consensus among federal and provincial 
governments.  As a result, since the separation of East Pakistan, there have been only 
three conclusive NFC Awards (1974, 1991, 1997) and one presidential distribution order 
(2006) prior to the 7th NFC Award.    
In this context, one of the major developments in 2009-10 was a successfully 
concluded seventh NFC Award or NFC Award 2009, which affected the resource 
distribution formula.  Given the past experience of several inconclusive NFC Awards, a 
consensus based NFC Award is in itself a big achievement.  It is the first time after the 
secession of East Pakistan that the distribution of resources among provinces has been 
based not only on population but also on other factors such as backwardness, inverse 
population density and revenue collection/generation. The NFC Award 2009 has also 
helped to resolve other issues such as Gas Development Surcharge (GDS) and 
Hydroelectricity Profit.  
This paper aims to analyse the financial implications of the NFC Award 2009 and 
its impact on three major social services namely education, health, and water supply and 
 
Muhammad Sabir <muhammadsabir@spdc.org.pk> is Principal Economist, Social Policy and 
Development Centre (SPDC), Karachi. 
Muhammad Sabir 388 
sanitation.  This analysis would not only add to relevant research in Pakistan but would 
also help in identifying policy implications for future NFC Awards.  
 
2.  AN OVERVIEW OF THE NFC AWARDS 
The history of intergovernmental fiscal transfers from the federal government to 
the provincial governments in the sub-continent dates back to 1919. Since the 
independence of Pakistan in 1947, these transfers have experienced many changes in line 
with constitutional developments. However, as in other countries, the purpose of fiscal 
transfer system in Pakistan is primarily to correct the vertical fiscal imbalances between 
the federal and the provincial governments and horizontal imbalances between provinces.  
According to the constitution of Pakistan, the NFC is set up by the president of 
Pakistan every five years.   This commission allocates or awards the total resources or 
revenues collected during a fiscal year between the federal government and provincial 
governments, hence such a decision is called the NFC Award.  The NFC Award decides 
the method for allocating the resource transfers for five years based on a formula for 
revenue sharing.  Table 1 gives the chronology of NFC Awards in Pakistan.  It shows that 
since the separation of East Pakistan, there have been only three conclusive NFC Awards 
(1974, 1991, 1996) in addition to a Distributional Order 2006—only three NFC Awards 
during a period of 32 years (1974 to 2006).  After the NFC Award 1974, two attempts 
were made for the revision in the design of intergovernmental transfers but these were 
unsuccessful.  The much awaited NFC Award was then materialised in 1990-91. This 
was followed by the NFC Award 1996 constituted for a period of five years (1996-97 to 
2001-02), but remained in practice till 2005-06.  In 2006, a distribution order from the 
president of Pakistan replaced the NFC Award 1997. 
 
Table 1 
Chronology of NFC Awards 
S. No.          Name     Status 
First NFC Award 1974 Conclusive 
Second NFC Award 1979 Inconclusive 
Third NFC Award 1985 Inconclusive 
Fourth NFC Award 1991 Conclusive 
Fifth 
NFC Award 1995 Inconclusive 
NFC Award 1997 Conclusive 
Sixth 
NFC Award 2002 Inconclusive 
Distribution Order 2006 – 
Seventh NFC Award 2009 Conclusive 
 
On the distribution method, all the commissions up to the fourth NFC (1991) 
followed the ―gap-filling‖ approach.  This approach assesses the revenue receipts and 
expenditure based on the actual numbers and recommends non-plan deficit grants to fill 
the financing gaps.  This approach encouraged the provincial governments to understate 
the predicted growth of their own tax revenues, to increase their commitments on non-
plan expenditure, and to run deficit budgets in the expectation that their financing gaps 
would be filled by grants from the Finance Commission. Apart from encouraging 
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inefficiency, this approach also resulted in qualifying relatively better off provinces for 
such grants while disqualifying some of the poor provinces.  
The fifth Finance Commission adopted a new formula for the allocation of federal 
transfers.  This differed from the previous one on two grounds: (1) it was based on the 
new idea of National Resource Picture; and (2) it included all federal taxes in the 
divisible pool with revised shares.  In addition, it provided constitutional subvention for 
relatively two backward provinces Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Balochistan.  
Subsequent NFCs were constituted in 2000 and 2005 but an award could not be agreed 
upon.  Finally, in the absence of any recommendation from the sixth Finance 
Commission, the ―Distribution of Revenues and Grants-in-Aid (Amendment) Order 
(DRGO) 2006‖ was passed by the president of Pakistan. The DRGO 2006 differs with 
other NFC Awards in three ways.  First, it introduced a variable share of provincial 
governments (ranges from 41.50 percent in 2006-07 to 46.25 percent in 2010-11).  
Second, it introduced two divisible pools: one is the largest divisible pool which relied on 
population as a sole criterion for horizontal distribution and other was used for 
distribution of 1/6th of the sales tax on new shares of 50, 34.85, 9.93 and 5.22 for Punjab, 
Sindh, KPK and Balochistan respectively.  Third, it separately awarded grants-in-aid to 
all provinces based on an unknown criterion.  
 
2.1.  Key Elements of NFC Award 2009 
The NFC Award 2009 has brought some profound changes in the resource 
distribution formula. It is for the first time since 1973 that the distribution of resources 
among provinces is based not only on population but also on other criteria such as 
backwardness, inverse population density and revenue collection/generation.  This Award 
has also helped in resolving other issues such as GDS and Hydroelectricity Profit.  The 
financial implications of this Award for the federal and provincial governments are vast 
and long-lasting with a substantial increase in transfers from the federal government to 
provinces due to the following five reasons.   
(1) The collection charges of the federal government have been decreased from 5 
percent to 1 percent, thereby enlarging the overall size of the divisible pool.  
(2) The federal government and all the four provincial governments recognised 
the role of KPK as a frontline province against the war on terror. One percent 
of net proceedings of the divisible pool are therefore earmarked for KPK 
during the entire award period.  For instance, in 2010-11, KPK will receive an 
additional amount of Rs 15 billion against the additional costs it is bearing due 
to the war on terror.  
(3) The remaining proceeds of the provincial share of the divisible pool have been 
increased from 46.25 percent to 56 percent in 2010-11 and then to 57.5 percent 
for the rest of the award period.  This means that the share of the federal 
government in the net divisible pool would be 44 percent in 2010-11 and 42.5 
percent during the rest of the award period.  
(4) This award ensures that Balochistan will get at least Rs 83 billion under 
divisible pool transfers. In case the estimated share of Balochistan is less than 
Rs 83 billion, the balance funds would be contributed by federal government.   
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(5) GST on services collected in the Central Excise (CE) mode is also transferred to 
the provincial governments under the straight transfer mode—implying that 
revenues collected from a province would be transferred to that province on the 
basis of collection. The budget 2010-11, however, did not adhere to this principle.  
In addition, the NFC Award 2009 also allows Gas Development Surcharge (GDS) 
arrears to be paid retroactively to Balochistan on the basis of the new formula and for the 
payment of the long held up hydel profits to KPK. 
 
2.2.  Vertical Distribution of Divisible Pool 
Table 2 presents the formula for vertical distribution or the provincial share in the 
divisible pool of NFC awards. It indicates that until the NFC Award 1991, provincial 
governments had been receiving 80 percent of two major federal taxes ―Sales Tax‖ and 
―Income and Corporation Tax‖, which were the most buoyant sources of revenues and 
the focus of tax and tariff reforms initiated in the early 1990s.  Another important point is 
that the share of provinces was further increased by including in it the federal excise duty 




Provincial Share in Divisible Pool Taxes  
(%) 
Divisible Pool Taxes NFC 1974 NFC 1991 NFC 1997 DRGO 2006 NFC 2010 
Income Tax and Corporation Tax* 80 80 37.5 41.50 – 46.25 56.0 – 57.5 
    – Other Direct Taxes – – 37.5 41.50 – 46.25 56.0 – 57.5 
Sales Tax 80 80 37.5 41.50 – 46.25 56.0 – 57.5 
Central Excise Duty** –  
37.5 41.50 – 46.25 56.0 – 57.5      – Tobacco – 80 
     – Sugar – 80 
Import Duties – – 37.5 41.50 – 46.25 56.0 – 57.5 
Export Duties 
     – Cotton 80 80 – – – 
  *Excluding taxes on income consisting of remuneration paid out of federal consolidated fund. 
**Excluding Central Excise Duty on Natural Gas. 
 
In contrast, the NFC Award 1997 included all federal taxes in the divisible pool 
and decreased the provincial share from 80 percent to 37.5 percent, which was less than 
half of their previous share.  This change was based on optimistic revenue targets of 
certain macroeconomic projections such as 17 percent growth in nominal GDP, 11 
percent domestic and external inflation rate and higher expectations of revenue collection 
from tax and tariff reforms.  However, these expectations did not materialise due to many 
external and internal shocks that largely affected the federal tax collection.  
 
2.3.  Horizontal Distribution of the Divisible Pool 
Table 3 shows the formula for horizontal distribution of the divisible pool in NFC 
Awards.  It points out that the entire distribution of divisible pool among provinces in the first 
three conclusive NFC Awards and in DRGO was based only on population.  However, the 
NFC Award 2009 framed the distribution of the divisible pool based on four weighted factors.  
These include: population (82 percent), poverty and backwardness (10.3 percent), revenue 
collection/generation (5 percent) and inverse population density (2.7 percent).  
The 7th NFC Award and the Impact on Social Services 391 
Table 3 
Factors Used in Horizontal Distribution of Divisible Pool Taxes 
(%) 
Factors NFC 1974 NFC 1991 NFC 1997 DRGO 2006* NFC 2010 
Population 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 82.0 
Poverty/Backwardness – – – – 10.3 
Revenue Collection/Generation – – – – 5.0 
Inverse Population Density – – – – 2.7 
*Other than 1/6th of sales tax collected and distributed in lieu of Octroi/Zila Tax. 
 
3.  FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NFC AWARD 2009 
Table 4 presents the vertical distribution of FBR tax estimates in Budget 2010-11 
as per the NFC Award 2009.  The FBR tax revenue target for 2010-11 is Rs 1,647 billion. 
The federal government will receive money from these taxes under two heads: (1) 
divisible pool share, and (2) others, largely based on collection charges and export duties.  
According to this, the total share of the federal government in FBR taxes in 2010-11 
would be Rs 683 billion.  Similarly, four provincial governments altogether receive 
revenues under two heads: (1) divisible pool transfers, and (2) others, an aggregate of 
revenue transfer under war on terror, provincial GST, excise duty on natural gas and 
grant for Balochistan to meet the minimum requirement of Rs 83 billion.  As a result, the 
total share of the four provincial governments would be Rs 964 billion if the FBR 
achieved its tax collection targets.   
Table 5 presents the horizontal distribution of FBR taxes estimates in Budget 
2010-11 as per the NFC Award 2009.  Of the total Rs 844 billion in divisible pool, 
Punjab would accrue Rs 437 billion (51.7 percent), Sindh Rs 207 billion (24.6 percent), 
KPK Rs 123 billion (14.6 percent) and Balochistan Rs 77 billion (9.1 percent). Of the 
total 118 billion transfers in the ―others‖ category, KPK would receive Rs 15.2 billion 
under the head of war on terror. In order to meet the requirement of a minimum transfer 
of Rs 83 billion for Balochistan, the federal government would give an additional Rs 6.3 
billion to Balochistan. Table 5 also shows the excise duty on natural gas separately 
because this is a provincial tax and the federal government transfers this tax separately to 
provinces after deducting collection charges.  
 
Table 4 
Vertical Distribution of FBR Taxes as per the 7th NFC Award 




Federal  Revenues Provincial  Revenues 
Divisible 
Pool 
Others Total Divisible 
Pool 
Others Total 
Income Tax 633,000 270,220 10,113 280,333 343,916 8,751 352,667 
Capital Value Tax  4,700 2,027 28 2,055 2,580 66 2,645 
Customs  180,800 76,231 5,079 81,310 97,021 2,469 99,490 
Sales Tax  674,900 251,802 3,465 255,267 320,475 99,157 419,633 
Federal Excise  153,600 63,095 868 63,964 80,303 9,333 89,636 
 Total  1,647,000 663,375 19,553 682,929 844,296 119,776 964,071 
Source: Author’s estimates based on Budget Estimates of 2010-11, Explanatory Memorandum on Federal 
Receipts 2010-11. 
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Table 5 
Horizontal Distribution of FBR Taxes as per the 7th NFC Award* 
(Rs Millions) 
  Punjab Sindh KPK Balochistan Total 
Divisible Pool Taxes      
 Taxes on Income  177,942 84,431 50,281 31,262 343,916 
 Capital Value Tax  1,335 633 377 234 2,580 
 Sales Tax (Goods)  50,199 23,819 14,185 8,819 97,021 
 Federal Excise (Net of Gas)  165,814 78,677 46,853 29,131 320,475 
 Customs Duties  41,549 19,714 11,740 7,300 80,303 
 Total: Divisible Taxes (A)  436,839 207,275 123,436 76,746 844,296 
Others      
 War on Terror/Other Transfers – – 15,229 6,254 21,483 
 Excise Duty on Natural Gas  407 5,025 209 1,503 7,144 
 G.S.T (Provincial)  51,155 21,145 12,325 4,557 89,183 
 Total: Other Transfers (B)  51,563 26,170 27,763 12,314 117,810 
 Total Transfers (A+B)  488,401 233,445 151,199 89,060 962,106 
Source: Author’s estimates based on Budget Estimates of 2010-11, Explanatory Memorandum on Federal 
Receipts 2010-11. 
 
An interesting implication of the NFC Award 2009 is the acceptance of provincial 
rights over GST services.  As per the constitution, GST services is a provincial tax, 
however, FBR collects it under two heads: (1) GST services (CE Mode) and (2) GST 
services (provincial).  While GST services (provincial) is directly transferred to 
provincial governments after deducting collection charges, GST services (CE Mode) is 
treated as GST on goods which is distributed among the federal and provincial 
governments similar to other divisible pool taxes.  The NFC Award 2009 treats both GST 
services (CE Mode) and GST services (provincial) as GST services (provincial) and 
transfers the amount collected under this tax to provincial governments after deducting 
collection charges. Thus while the anomaly in vertical distribution of GST services has 
been resolved in the NFC Award 2009, the horizontal distribution of this tax is still an 
unsettled impediment.  The distribution of GST services shown in Table 5 is as reported 
in federal budget documents, which is based on population share of provinces.  The 
distribution of GST on services on the basis of population, though beneficial for Punjab 
and KPK, is not in line with the spirit of the NFC constitution.  Nevertheless, the 
disagreement over the distribution of GST on services is reflected in the revised federal 
budget documents as it is stated ―The indicative share of GST on services (provincial) are 
strictly provisional at this stage since a decision on levying a reformed GST has been 
deferred to 1st October, 2010. These shares would be revised in the light of a decision 
taken after discussion with the provinces. The final share so determined would take effect 
from 1st July, 2010.‖  
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3.1.  Comparison of NFC Award 2009 with DRGO 2006 
Table 6 shows the comparison of NFC Award 2009 with DRGO 2006.  It indicates 
that the federal government would receive almost Rs920 billion revenues in 2010-11 if 
the DRGO 2006 would continue.  However, due to revision in resources distribution 
formula in 2010, the federal government would get revenues amounting to Rs 685 billion. 
As a result of the NFC Award 2009, the federal revenues would decline by Rs 235 billion 
in 2010-11 compared to revenues under DRGO 2006.  
 
Table 6 
Comparative Impact on Federal Revenues NFC Award 2009 and DRGO 2006 
 (Rs Million)  
  NFC Award 2009 DRGO 2006 Difference 
Income Tax 280,333 357,803 –77,470 
Capital Value Tax  2,055 2,635 –580 
Customs  81,310 103,132 –21,822 
Sales Tax  257,087 374,142 –117,054 
Federal Excise  64,109 82,171 –18,061 
 Total  684,894 919,882 –234,988 
Source: Author’s estimates based on Budget Estimates of 2010-11, Explanatory Memorandum on Federal 
Receipts 2010-11. 
 
Table 7 shows province-wise financial implications of the NFC Awards 2010 in 
comparison with DRGO 2006.  It indicates that in absolute terms, Punjab is the biggest 
beneficiary of the NFC Award 2009, as it is likely to receive Rs 83 billion additional 
revenues in 2010-11 as per NFC 2010 compared to DRGO 2006. This is on two counts: 
one, Punjab’s share of higher than 50 percent in the divisible pool allows it to benefit the 
most from the huge increase in vertical transfers; two, the distribution of GST on services 
on the basis of population rather than on collection adds to this increase. 
In percentage terms, however, Balochistan is the major beneficiary, with an 
increase of more than 100 percent, followed by KPK.  The relative picture shows that in 
percentage terms, the NFC Award 2009 is more beneficial for relatively backward 
provinces.  Gain from NFC Award 2009 to Sindh may increase if GST services 
(provincial) is not distributed on the basis of population.  
 
Table 7 
Comparative Impact on Provincial Revenues NFC Award 2009 and DRGO 2006 
(Rs Million)  
  NFC Award 2009 DRGO 2006 Difference 
Punjab  488,401 405,607 82,794 
Sindh  233,445 187,502 45,943 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 151,199 95,599 55,600 
Balochistan  89,060 38,410 50,650 
 Total  962,106 727,118 234,988 
Source: Author’s estimates based on Budget Estimates of 2010-11, Explanatory Memorandum on Federal 
Receipts. 
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3.2.  Comparison of the NFC Award 2009 with the NFC Award 1997 
Table 8 presents a comparison of federal revenues under the NFC Award 2009 
with the NFC Award 1997.  It indicates that the federal government would receive almost 
Rs1055 billion in 2010-11 if the 1997 NFC Award would continue. However, due to 
revision in resource distribution formula in 2010 the federal government would get Rs685 
billion. As a result of the NFC Award 2009 federal revenues would decline by Rs370 
billion in 2010-11 compared to revenues under NFC Award 1997.  
 
Table 8 
Comparative Impact on Federal Revenues NFC Award 2009 and NFC Award 1997 
(Rs Million)  
  NFC Award 2009 NFC Award 1997 Difference 
Income Tax 280,333 409,868 –129,535 
Capital Value Tax  2,055 3,026 –971 
Customs  81,310 117,826 –36,516 
Sales Tax  257,087 429,616 –172,529 
Federal Excise  64,109 94,333 –30,223 
 Total  684,894 1,054,668 –369,773 
Source: Author’s estimates based on Budget Estimates of 2010-11 published in Explanatory Memorandum on 
Federal Receipts. 
 
Table 9 highlights the province-wise financial implications of the NFC Awards 
2010 in comparison with the NFC Award 1997.  The province-wise federal transfers 
show that in absolute terms, Punjab is likely to receive Rs152 billion additional revenues 
in 2010-11 as per the NFC Award 2009 compared to the 1997 NFC Award. The 
comparative picture of other provinces show that Sindh, KPK and Balochistan are likely 
to receive Rs 90 billion, Rs 70 billion and Rs 57 billion additional revenues in 2010-11 as 
per the NFC 2010 compared to the NFC Award 1997.  
 
Table 9 
Comparative Impact on Provincial Revenues NFC Award 2009 and NFC Award 1997 
(Rs Million)  
  NFC Award 2009 NFC Award 1997 Difference 
Punjab  488,401 336,071 152,330 
Sindh  233,445 143,773 89,672 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 151,199 81,082 70,117 
Balochistan  89,060 31,406 57,654 
 Total  962,106 592,332 369,773 
Source: Author’s estimates based on Budget Estimates of 2010-11, Explanatory Memorandum on Federal 
Receipts. 
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3.3.  Comparison of NFC Award 2009 with NFC Award 1991 
Table 10 displays a comparison of federal revenues under the NFC Award 2009 
with the NFC Award 1991.  While the previous two comparisons show that the NFC 
Award 2009 caused a declined in federal revenues, comparison with NFC Award 
1991gives an opposite picture.  It indicates that federal government would receive almost 
Rs 607 billion in 2010-11 if the 1991 NFC Award would continue.  However, due to 
revision in resources distribution formula in 2010 it would get Rs 685 billion.  Thus, as a 
result of the NFC Award 2009, the federal government is likely to receive an addition of 
Rs 78 billion in comparison with the NFC Award 1991.  It is important to note that while 
revenues from customs, capital value tax and part of federal excise are not shared with 
provincial governments, the high share of provinces in two buoyant sources of revenues 
income and sales tax causes a substantial reduction in federal revenues.     
 
Table 10 
Comparative Impact on Federal Revenues NFC Award 2009 and NFC Award 1991 
(Rs Million)  
  NFC Award 2009 NFC Award 1991 Difference 
Income Tax 280,333 156,984 123,349 
Capital Value Tax  2,055 4,700 -2,645 
Customs  81,310 180,800 -99,490 
Sales Tax  257,087 160,168 96,920 
Federal Excise  64,109 104,050 -39,941 
 Total  684,894 606,702 78,193 
Source: Author’s estimates based on Budget Estimates of 2010-11, Explanatory Memorandum on Federal 
Receipts 2010-11. 
 
Table 11 brings to light a very important aspect of the NFC Award 2009 in 
comparison with the NFC Award 1991.  It indicates that while there is a decline in 
vertical share of provinces under the NFC Award 2009 compared to the 1991 NFC 
Award, this decline is not evenly distributed among the provinces.  For instance, if the 
NFC Award 1991 had continued, Punjab and Sindh would have been likely to receive an 
additional amount of Rs 105 billion and Rs 17 billion respectively compared to the NFC 
Award 2009.  In contrast, KPK and Balochistan would have been likely to receive Rs 8 
billion and Rs 35 billion less in 2010-11 respectively compared to transfers as per the 
NFC Award 2009.  This indicates that the NFC Award 2009 benefits the two relatively 
more backward provinces, KPK and Balochistan.  
 
Table 11 
Comparative Impact on Provincial Revenues NFC Award 2009  
and NFC Award 1991 
(Rs Million)  
  NFC Award 2009 NFC Award 1991 Difference 
Punjab  488,401 593,025 –104,623 
Sindh  233,445 249,986 –16,541 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 151,199 142,991 8,208 
Balochistan  89,060 54,297 34,763 
 Total  962,106 1,040,298 –78,193 
Source: Author’s estimates based on Budget Estimates of 2010-1, Explanatory Memorandum on Federal 
Receipts 2010-11. 
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4.  IMPACT ON SOCIAL SERVICES 
Public expenditure on social services such as education and health is generally 
considered as a source of poverty reduction as it contributes to human capital formation.  
Moreover, public spending on social services would likely cause a positive impact on 
achieving the Millennium Development Goals. However, Pakistan falls among the 
countries that spend a very low share of their GDP on the social sector.  
Table 12 shows a comparison of Pakistan with other East and South Asian 
countries. It is interesting to note that public spending on education in Bangladesh is 
higher than the public spending on three social services in Pakistan namely education, 
health, and water supply and sanitation. Even public spending on education in India is 
more than double what it is in Pakistan. Similarly, governments in Thailand, Malaysia, 
Iran and Vietnam spend a much higher share of their GDP on education as compared to 
Pakistan. Several plans have been made to increase the share on public spending on 
social services in Pakistan. At policy planning level almost all policy documents 
including five year plans, MTDF, MTBF, PRSPs gave greater importance to social sector 
spending. Similarly, the 1997 NFC Award and the Fiscal Responsibility and Debt 
Limitation Act, 2005 included social sector spending in the list of priority expenditures. 
However social sector spending has remained very low, particularly after the 1997 NFC 
award. The allocation of higher share of taxes to provinces under the seventh NFC Award 
provides a hope that these expenditures as a percentage of GDP may rise during the 
current five year period.   
 
Table 12 
Public Sector Spending on Education: A Comparison  
with Selected Asian Countries 
(As Percentage of GDP) 
Country Public Sector Spending  
Vietnam  5.3 
Iran  5.2 
Malaysia  4.7 
Thailand  4.5 
Indonesia  3.5 
India  3.3 
Nepal  3.2 
Bangladesh  2.6 
Pakistan  
  Education 
  Health 





Source: Pakistan Economic Survey 2009-10 for other countries and  Authors estimate for Pakistan. 
 
In this context, this section analyses the estimated impact of financial implications 
of the NFC Award 2009 in comparison with the DRGO 2006, the NFC Award 1997 and 
the NFC Award 1991 on provincial social services.  The analysis is based on a hypothesis 
that a change in design of federal transfers in favour of provincial government would be 
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likely to cause an increase in social sector expenditures. This may occur because 
provincial governments are primarily responsible for the financing and delivery of social 
services and any increase in their resources may allow them to allocate and spend more 
money on social services.   
 
4.1.  Empirical Strategy 
A search of publically available research did not indicate sufficient empirical studies 
that tested the response of change in intergovernmental transfers on social services 
expenditures.  There is a substantial descriptive literature addressing many aspects of 
intergovernmental transfers with respect to fiscal competition among the sub-national 
governments [Musgrave (1997)], market incentives of federalism [Qian and Weingast 
(1997)], intergovernmental transfers and deadweight losses in tax system [Smart (1996)], 
coordination failure [De Mello Jr. (2000)], survey of approaches in designing 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers [Bird and Smart (2002)], principles and practices of 
intergovernmental transfer [Boadway and Shah (2007)] and finally social policy and state 
revenues [Hinojosa, Bebbington, Barrientos, and Addison (2010)]. However, this body of 
work really did not shed much light on the normative question of consequences of any change 
in the designed mechanism of intergovernmental transfers on provincial expenditures.  
In Pakistan Ghaus and Pasha (1996) and Sabir (2001) developed and tested an 
econometric model for Pakistan to evaluate the consequences of the NFC Awards 1991 
and 1997. The current study has benefitted with the methodological framework 
developed in Sabir (2002) which developed two separate equations to estimate the impact 
of the NFC Award 1997 on the social sector and other service related expenditures (see 
Appendix). In line with its scope this paper is restricted to the estimation of the following 





























































 SE = real per capita social sector expenditures (both recurring and development) 
 Y = real per capita income 
 p1 = General Price Level (CPI) 
 p2 = price index of public expenditure 
 T = per capita total intergovernmental transfers  
 B = per capita borrowing by the provincial government 
 m = proportion of the provincial revenue deficit financed by deficit grants 
 G0 = lump sum grants 
 D91= capturing the impact of deficit grants and having value 1 prior to 
implementation 1991 NFC Award afterwards zero 
 D92 = having value zero prior to 1991 NFC Award afterwards 1 
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Estimated Results 
Due to limitation on the availability of the basic data (for example, the data on 
provincial gross domestic products and inflation are not available), province wise 
analysis was not possible. Therefore, the above model was estimated for the four 
provincial governments combined. Annual budget statements of the individual provinces 
have been used to generate the aggregate database for key provincial budgetary 
magnitudes.  The above equation is estimated for the period 1972-73 to 2007-08. Results 
of estimation are given in Table 13. 
 
Table 13 
Results of Estimation—1973-74 to 2009-101 
Dependent Variable—Real Per Capita Social Sector Expenditures 
Independent Variable Constant P1Y/p2 p1/p2 (T+Go+B+D92)/p2 B*D91 DUM 
Coefficient – 0.058 + 0.018 –1.381 + 0.194 +0.301 0.908 
t-Statistic (–0.071) (4.991) (–2.257) (4.369) (4.194) (10.230) 
Adjusted R2   0.978   Durbin-Watson stat 1.798  
 
The signs of all the estimated coefficients are theoretically consistent. Each coefficient 
is significantly different from zero at a 5 percent significance level as apparent from the t-
statistics. The value of adjusted R
2
 indicates that the first model explains almost 98 percent 
variation in provincial social sector expenditures.  According to the estimated equation an 
increase or decrease of Rs 100 in either the real federal transfers or lump sum grants or 
borrowing can affect the social sector expenditures by Rs 19.40 in real terms.  
Based on the above estimated equation and projected values of all explanatory 
variables for 2010-11, social sector expenditures are forecasted for transfers under the NFC 
Award 2009, the DRGO 2006, the NFC Award 1997 and the NFC Award 1997.  Table 14 
provides these forecasted values.  It indicates that after the NFC Award 1991 transfers under 
the NFC Award 2009 are likely to cause a higher increase in social sector expenditure.  In the 
absence of a conclusive NFC Award in 2010, DRGO 2006 would have been continued in 
2010-11.  Therefore, a comparison of social sector expenditure is made with DRGO 2006. As 
indicated by the last column of Table 14, due to a conclusive NFC Award in 2010, it is 




Impact of NFC Awards on Social Sector Expenditures 
 (Rs Billion)  
  Forecast Difference 
DRGO 2006 409.7 0.0 
7th NFC Award 455.3 45.6 
1997 NFC Award 383.5 -26.2 
1991 NFC Award 470.5 60.8 
 
1Since the model is based on ratios, non stationary issues did not exist in estimation. This is further 
investigated by using Augmented Dickey Fuller unit root test in E-views, which confirmed the stationary nature 
of the variables used in estimation. These results are available on request from the author.  
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5.  CONCLUSION 
NFC Awards are regularly set up after every five years under article 160 of the 
constitution. However, there are fewer examples of conclusive NFC Awards due to lack 
of consensus among federating units.  In this regard, the NFC Award 2009 is a big 
success of the present democratic regime. This Award successfully made substantial 
changes in the design of the resource distribution mechanism.  It explicitly introduced 
multiple indicators for horizontal distribution for the first time, allocated higher share of 
resources to provincial governments and correspondingly lower share to federal 
government.  Given that provincial governments are largely responsible for financing and 
delivery of social services, this paper makes an attempt to simulate the impact of this 
increase on social services expenditures.  The projected values of social sector 
expenditures indicate that the NFC Award 2009 has a potentially positive impact on 
social sector spending. Given that Pakistan has a comparative low spending on social 
services, this award is a positive move. Hence, it also helps increasing the pace of 






The estimated equation is based on the methodological framework developed in 
Sabir (2002). A brief description of the major assumptions used in developing micro-
theoretic framework is reproduced below.    
The methodological framework is based on the assumption that politicians/ 
officials want to maximise the utility of a typical consumer (median consumer) in their 
jurisdiction subject to budget constraint. For the sake of simplicity, the consumption 
basket of a typical citizen (median consumer) can be divided into two broad groups; 
publicly provided goods and services (A), and privately provided goods and services 
(B). Utility was assumed to depend positively on the quantity of goods and services 
provided by the provincial government (A) and on the level of consumption of private 
goods (B).  
U = U (QA, QB) 
 
The goods and services provided by provincial government can be divided into 
social services and, other goods and services 
 
U = U (QS, QO, QB) 
 
The quantity of demand of each good and services depends upon the expenditure 
(public/private) on it.  In the case of private goods and services, expenditure would be 
equal to real per capita disposable income of the consumer or (y – R), where y is the real 
per capita income and R is the real per capita revenue received by the government.  
Similarly, in case of publicly provided goods and services, expenditure would be equal to 
provincial government expenditure on social services (SE) and other services (OE).  
Therefore, the utility function can be rewritten as  
 
U = U (SE, OE, Y – R)  … … … … … … (1) 
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R includes both tax and non-tax revenues, while SE and OE consist of both 
recurring, and development expenditures on publically provided social services and other 
services.  The payments for servicing of debt are excluded as these do not benefit citizens 
directly through provision of services. 
The sources of revenues for provincial government except its own revenues are 
federal transfers from the divisible pool, development and non-development grants and 
borrowings.  Therefore, the budget constraint of the provincial government (at current 
prices) can be expressed as: 
GBTRpOESEp  12 )(  … … … … … (2) 
  
Where Y = real per capita income 
 R = real per capita provincial revenue (include both tax and non-tax revenues) 
 SE = real per capita social sector expenditures (both recurring and development) 
 OE = real per capita other expenditures (both recurring and development) 
 p1 = General Price Level (CPI) 
 p2  = price index of public expenditure 
 T = per capita total intergovernmental transfers  
 B = per capita borrowing by the provincial government 
 
G consisted of two types of grants from federal government to provincial 
governments. These are lump sum grants (heavily consists of development grants) and 
deficit grant (heavily consists of non-development and non-obligatory grants). Therefore, 
by definition, the total flow of grants is given as:  
10],)([ 0120  mGTRpOESEpmGG   … … … (3) 
 
Where m = proportion of the revenue deficit financed by deficit grants. 
Deficit grant has played a very significant role in the provincial finances before 
1991 but this option was curtailed in the 1991 NFC Award. However, lump sum grants 
are still provided to the provinces for their development projects.  
Substituting (3) into (2) we obtain, 
BGGTRpOESEp D  012 )(  … … … … (4) 
 
After addition of p1y on both sides of the equation (4) the budget constraint can be 
written as:  
BGGTYpOSEpSSEpRYp D  01221 )(  … … … (5) 
 
Based on the above set of equations, a utility maximisation problem can be set up 
as follows: 
)]()([),,(),,,( 21 OESEpRYpIOESERYUOESER   … (6) 
Where   I = P1Y + T + G0 + GD + B 
The first order conditions are as follows: 












































 … … … … (10) 
 
The above derivation based on a micro-theoretic approach provides the 
information on the signs of partial derivatives of the function, but it needs an explicit 
utility function for estimation purposes. In the analysis of consumer behaviour, many 
utility functions were used and among them, we chose the analogous Stone-Geary utility 



















The Stone-Geary utility function has particular advantages over other functions. 
The most important advantage of the Stone-Geary utility function is the inclusion of y0, 
SE0, and OE0, which are ―minimum survival bundles‖ and ensure the subsistence level of 
consumer demand for public and private goods and services. Substituting the derivatives 


























  … … … … … … (14) 
 













 … … … (15) 
 
Minimum bundle of income y0 was assumed to be partly constant and partly rises with 
income y. 
yy 100   












 … … (16) 
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After substituting the value from Equation 16 into 12, 13 and 14, we finally have 




























))(1()()1)(( 21021121011211  
        20021 ))(1( pOESEB   … … … … … (19) 
 
Equations (17) and (18) are the desired expenditure equations. Divided both 


























































  (21) 
 





























































           })1{( 0202 SESE   … … … … … (23) 
 
The value of D91 is 1 prior to 1991 NFC Award otherwise zero and the value of 
D92 is 1 after the 1991 NFC Award, otherwise zero.  
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